By Masri Feki © Metula News Agency (Israel)
February 1, 2007

The association between Bashar el-Assad's regime and the Islamic Republic of Iran can be accounted for by the growing insulation of Syria within its Arab environment. But has Damascus, the last stronghold of pan-Arabic nationalism, reached the point of no return in its confrontation with the “moderate Arab axis” represented by Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan?

Two years ago, Syria struggled to find support within its Arab environment. In the Arab League, its traditional Egyptian ally seems to become increasingly favourable to the United States. The poor personal relations between Bashar el-Assad and Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak strongly influence the diplomatic relations between the two countries, so that, important official meetings notwithstanding, the divergencies between Syria and Egypt are getting ever wider. As for Saudi Arabia, it cannot be called Syria’s true ally even today, after the Lebanese crisis and the exposure of Syrian involvement in the assassination of Rafik Hariri, the Sunni and pro-Saudi former Lebanese Prime Minister, on St. Valentine's Day, 2005. The insulation of Syria was further reinforced by the medical cord set up by France and the United States at the time of the adoption, in September 2004, of the resolution 1559 - while Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Jordan kept their peace.

Moreover, during the war between Israel and the Lebanese Hezbullah in July-August 2006, these countries (Egypt and Saudi Arabia) denounced the adventurism of the pro-Syrian Lebanese militia and supported the Lebanese government of Fouad Siniora. The situation smacked of the Cold War, a period when the Middle East had been divided in two. On several occasions, Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak and his Syrian counterpart Bashar el-Assad accused each other of cowardice. Egypt, just like Saudi Arabia and Jordan, had opposed the war initiated by Hezbullah, while Syria had supported it. The escalation in mutual accusations became especially prominent on August 15, 2006, when, in a belligerent address, Bashar el-Assad called the Arab leaders who had denounced "the adventurism" of Hezbullah “half-men”, albeit without pointing a finger at anyone in particular. On July 14, this expression appeared in official statements of the Egyptian president and King Abdallah II of Jordan. This verbal assault, launched by president Assad with the intention of outbidding his opponents, marks yet another stage of Syria's growing insulation within the Middle East, for by adopting such a radical position, the Syrian raïs obviously alienated the leaders of the area, who would otherwise have taken more heed of his arguments. This move both considerably weakened Syria and rendered it more dependent on the Islamic Republic of Iran.

But the Syrian régime did not give up at this point. Little by little, Damascus regained its standing by stoking Cairo's fears of democratization following the American model and by subtly exploiting the apprehensions of the Saudis and Jordanians with regard to Islamic terrorism. Thus, the 136 terrorists arrested in December 2006 in Saudi Arabia, had been members of the dormant cells formed by General Assef Shawkate, chief of the Syrian military intelligence and president Bashar el-Assad's brother-in-law. According to the Kuwaiti daily newspaper Al-Syassah , Shawkate must have given his orders to the terrorist networks operating not only in Arabia, but also in Egypt and Jordan, to destabilize these three countries, generally considered as moderate. The 136 arrested terrorists, most of whom are Saudi and Yemenite citizens, had arrived in the Saudi Kingdom from Syria, where they had been prepared to rejoin the ranks of Jihad in Iraq.

The presence on its territory of potential "martyrs" destined for Iraq is yet another card which Syria expertly played to negotiate its return to the regional arena. The first benefit thereof was gained in December 2006, when diplomatic relations between Syria and Iraq were resumed after a twenty-five years interval.

Relations with Iraq during the presidency of Hafez el-Assad were marked by numerous fluctuations. Sometimes this neighbouring State, which is Ba'thi as well, tended to join with Saddam Hussein to compete with Hafez el-Assad for leadership in the region: Syria supported Iran at the time of the Iran-Iraq war and was a member of the coalition during the first Gulf war. The invasion of Kuwait in 1990, and the resulting war, caused significant geostrategic changes in the area. Breaking away from his father's policy, Bashar el-Assad refused to form a coalition with the U.S. in Iraq. The ensuing embargo, as well as the bombardments, exasperated the Syrians, especially that Iraq no longer presented a threat for Syria. In 1998 the relations between them resumed, and the economic exchange intensified. Owing to the Western embargo, Iraq had a strong demand for basic manufactured goods, which Syrian industries were able to satisfy. Moreover, since the road infrastructures had been restored, the gas and oil trade could recommence. Today, the security situation does not allow a renewal of intense economic relations, for the Iraqi State is facing extremely difficult circumstances on the homefront. Even so, the threat posed to Damascus by the posting of the American troops near its borders with Iraq and Saudi Arabia has prompted Syria to renew its diplomatic relations with Iraq. One may only wonder how the relations between the Ba'thi Syrian State and the new Iraqi democracy will evolve. Hopefully, Iraq will put pressure on Damascus for more democracy and liberalism. But, as opposed to Iran, Iraq remains infinitely too weak. And it is here that the Iranian-Syrian axis may prove most effective.